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RECENT DECISIONS

INJUNCTIONS - EXTENT TO WHICH EQUITY WILL PROTECT A BUSINESS
THE THEORY THAT IT Is A PROPERTY RIGHT - Plaintiff, a corporation
engaged in publishing a newspaper, in order to increase circulation conducted a
puzzle contest, offering substantial prizes. Defendant, engaged in preparing and
selling answers to various prize contests, sold answers to contestants in plaintiff's
contests. Plaintiff sought to enjoin such activity. Held, that the right to conduct
a lawful business is a property right which may be protected from unlawful
interference. Even if, as mere offerees, the contestants are not bound to plaintiff by contract, defendant's acts amount to an inducement to tender spurious
performance and may therefore be enjoined as improper and unlawful interference with plaintiff's business. Philadelphia Record Co. v. Leopold, (D. C.
N. Y. 1941) 40 F. Supp. 346.
One's business or means of making a living is a property right which will
be protected against interference. 1 Such interference may be the basis for an
action for damages, or where the damage remedy is inadequate, the courts will
grant an injunction. 2 However, the right to protection of one's business is not
ON

1 Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (1871); Evenson v. Spaulding, (C. C. A. 9th,
1907) 150 F. 517; SPELLING and LEWIS, THE LAw OF INJUNCTION 224 (1926).
While the theory of a property right in business is a new legal doctrine, it is firmly
established. 38 MICH. L. REv. 1320 (1940). The protection given to the use of a
corporate name is based on the theory that the right to do business is protected. Grismore, "Are Unfair Methods of Competition Actionable at the Suit of a Competitor?"
33 MICH. L. REV. 321 (1935), says the basis of protection should be the property
right in business.
2 Dehydro, Inc. v. Tretolite Co., (D. C. Okla. 1931) 53 F. (2d) 273.

910

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 40

absolute. Although interference with such a property right is a wrong, in the
interests of public policy, the courts allow such interference when it is justified
by competition on the theory that free competition is a necessary part of our
economy and is permitted even though it causes some injury to the business of
another. 3 Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to protection only where the interference arises from wanton desire to injure and is based on no claim of selfadvancement, or where, although it results from competition, some unfair method
is used. 4 Such unfair methods include fraud, misrepresentation, coercion, and
inducement to breach of contract. 5 The broader view, taken by some writers,
is that unfair methods are any unreasonable exercise of th.e right of competition
which is destructive of plaintiff's business. 6 Under the latter view, when competition takes a form which is contrary to public policy, it can no longer be allowed as justification for interference with plaintiff's business. 7 However, where
competition exists, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's acts are in some
way improper or at least unreasonably destructive. 8 The carrying on of competition by inducing the customers of a competitor to break their contracts with
him has been held to be an unfair practice,9 and is a prima facie wrong where
the contract is for personal services.10 Where the contract does not involve personal services, the majority of the courts will not allow recovery unless improper
means are used.11 However, there is authority for the view that inducement to
breach of contract is wrongful even though fraud, coercion, misrepresentation,
etc., are not used to induce the breach. 12 In the principal case, the court seems
3 United Chain Theatres v. Philadelphia Moving Picture Machine Operators
Union, (D. C. Pa. 1931) 50 F. (2d) 189; Du-Art Film Laboratories v. Consolidated
Film Laboratories, (D. C. N. Y. 1936) 15 F. Supp. 689.
4 Some impropriety must be shown in the competition. People v. Victor, 287
Mich. 506, 283 N. W. 666 (1939); Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 at 564
(1871).
5 MooRE, LEGAL PROTECTION OF GooDWILL 46 (1936).
6 " • • • each business competitor must be limited to competition which is reasonable and fair•... Unfair competition means destruction of business and if permitted
would leave the business of each competitor subject to destruction by any other, in
whole or in part. • • . \Yhat is reasonable and fair . . . must be determined . • . by
applying the test of the average man ...." WALSH, EQUITY 235 (1930).
1 Wyman, "Competition and the Law," 15 HARV. L. REv. 427 at 444 (1902).
The author discusses the broad theory that competition is only a justification for interference and derives its strength as such from public policy.
8 WALSH, EQUITY 235 (1930).
9 Angle v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 151 U. S. 1, 14 S. Ct. 240 (1894).
10 Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216, n8 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853).
11 UNITED STATES FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, MEMORANDUM ON UNFAIR
CoMPETITION AT THE CoMMON LAw 6-21 (1916).
12 Heath v. American Book Co., (C. C. W. Va. 1899) 97 F. 533; Board of
Trade of Chicago v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 23"6, 25 S. Ct. 637 (1905).
For a discussion of this problem, see 16 HARV. L. REv. 228, and 299 (1903), where
it is contended that there is no valid distinction between the two types of contract and
that the burden should not be on the plaintiff to show addiional illegality. Also Du-Art
Film Laboratories v. Consolidated Film Laboratories, (D. C. N. Y. 1936) 15 F. Supp.
689, where the court lists "inducement to break an existing contract" among those things
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to adopt the broader view as to both improper competition and inducement to
breach of contract.13 Here the defendant's business depends for its existence
upon spurious performance of the plaintiff's contracts, which is necessarily accompanied by the destruction of part of the plaintiff's business. Defendant's
conduct seems to be an unreasonable exercise of the defendant's right to do business resulting in injury to another and will not be justified by the public policy
which fosters competition. Protection of the plaintiff's business on this theory is
an extension of the doctrine of protection of one of two conflicting businesses
beyond the older doctrine of protection against fraud, misrepresentation, and
coercion, and depends on the two broad theories that competition is a justification
for injury only where it is not unreasonably destructive and does serve the public
and that inducement to breach of contract is wrongful even where no fraud,
coercion, misrepresentation, etc., is employed.

which are not justified by competition. Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. De Witt, 120
Md. 381, 87 A. 927 (1913).
13 The court treats inducement to spurious performance of the contract as being
just as great a wrong as inducement to breach of contract.

